This study compares the characteristics and the price behavior of case-by-case privatization initial public offerings and private sector initial public offerings in Poland over the first nine years after the reopening of the Warsaw Stock Exchange in April 1991.
Introduction
In the past two decades a lot of state enterprises have been privatized in the world. This applies to developed economies like the UK, France or Germany as well as a lot of developing economies in Asia and South America. In Central and Eastern European transition economies the going public process of state enterprises started only at the begi nning of the nineties. After the breakdown of communism a process of restructuring and transformation from originally planned to market-oriented economies was started.
An important ingredient in such a radical transformation is the privatization of state enterprises. While in western economies state enterprises are transferred into a wellfunctioning economic system, this is not the case in Central and Eastern European countries where a suitable legal and institutional framework is not available at the start of the transformation process.
This study examines the characteristics as well as the short-and long-run price behavior The following questions are analyzed in this study: First, can the Polish government in the sense of Perotti (1995) and Biais and Perotti (1999) This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways: First, an Eastern European emerging market is examined completely from the resumption of the stock market.
Other studies, like Jones et al. (1999) , Megginson et al. (1999) , Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) or Huang and Levich (1998) The following section reviews the empirical evidence of studies examining the price performance of PIPOs. The third section discusses the theory and testable hypotheses about the short-and long-run price behavior of PIPOs and private sector IPOs. Section four describes the database used and provides descriptive statistics for the IPO groups.
2 Until now there have only been a few comparisons of this kind in the literature. Examples are Menyah and Paudyal (1996) , who examine privatization and private sector IPOs for the UK, Paudyal et al. (1998) , who compare these groups for Malaysia, and Jelic and Briston (1999) , who analyse the price behavior of Hungarian privatizations and private sector IPOs. The studies of Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) and Huang and Levich (1998) also compare privatization and private sector IPOs but they only analyze the underpricing.
*** Insert table 1 about here ***
The long-run performance of PIPOs has only been examined in recent years, at least on a large scale. For a 33-country sample of privatizations Megginson et al. (1999) find that regardless of the benchmark used the aftermarket performance of PIPOs is significantly positive. Menyal and Paudyal (1996) report similar results for a sample of 40 UK PIPOs. But not all studies document a significantly positive long-run performance for
PIPOs. Paudyal et al. (1998) find for Malaysia a negative (but not significantly negative) aftermarket performance over the first three years. Using a 26-country sample of 120 PIPOs, Boubarki and Cosset (1999) report insignificant market-adjusted average returns for a three-year holding period of 37% to 46% (Median: -7% to 13%). Nine
PIPOs in Chile experienced a significantly negative one-year aftermarket performance (see Aggarwal et al., 1993) . Panel B of table 1 provides a summary for six studies measuring the long-run performance of PIPOs.
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Studies explicitly comparing the characteristics and the price behavior of PIPOs and private sector IPOs are scarce. Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) test for differences between the mean initial return in PIPOs and the mean initial return in private sector IPOs.
For a 7-country sample (Canada, France, Hungary, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, and the UK) they find no general tendency for privatizations to be underpriced more than private sector IPOs. Only in the UK do government officials underprice public share offers of state-owned firms significantly more than their private company counterparts. For Canada and Malaysia, however, the opposite is true. In contrast, Paudyal et al. (1998) report that the average initial return on Malaysian PIPOs is significantly higher than on private sector IPOs. Jelic and Briston (1999) compare Hungarian PIPOs and private sector IPOs and report average initial market adjusted returns of 44% and 40% respectively. Consistent with Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) they document no significant difference between the initial returns for Hungarian PIPOs and private sector IPOs.
Evidence for a significantly positive long-run performance of PIPOs is also provided by Choi et al. (2000) and Dewenter and Malatesta (2000) .
Three studies explicitly comparing the long-run performance of PIPOs and private sector IPOs are shown in table 2. The three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return for UK PIPOs, for instance, is +61.0% for PIPOs and only +4.9% for private sector IPOs (see Menyal and Paudyal, 1996) . For Hungarian issues Jelic and Briston (1999) report a positive 3-year aftermarket performance for PIPOs but a negative one for private sector IPOs. They show that PIPOs perform significantly better in the long run than IPOs. In contrast to these findings, Paudyal et al. (1998) 
Underpricing
Many theories have been put forward to explain the underpricing of initial public offerings. In order to formulate hypotheses to explain the first-day return levels of Polish PIPOs and private sector IPOs, the most common and, in the case of Poland, testable explanations will be examined.
In Rock's model (1986) underpricing is a necessary equilibrium condition in a world of informational asymmetry between groups of informed and uninformed investors. Informed investors are able to distinguish between underpriced ('good') and overpriced ('bad') new issues and therefore avoid overpriced IPOs. 'Good' issues are subscribed for by informed as well as uninformed investors while 'bad' issues are subscribed for by 7 An extensive survey of empirical studies on privatizations are provided by Megginson and Netter (2000) .
uninformed investors only. It can therefore be expected that there is a positive relationship between the demand for an issue and the underpricing level.
8
Another consequence of informational asymmetry is that the level of underpricing required to attract investors increases with the ex-ante uncertainty about the value of the firm (see e.g. Beatty and Ritter (1986) ). The greater the ex-ante uncertainty, the more costly it is to value a new issue and the higher is the expected reward investors demand.
In order to test this proposition it is necessary to use a proxy for the unobservable exante uncertainty. In the empirical literature it is common to measure the ex-ante uncertainty by the standard deviation of daily returns in the first trading months.
9
The asymmetric information theories also imply that the uncertainty about the value of small, not established firms is higher than for offers of larger, well-known firms. This implies e.g. that offers of small, not established firms should be underpriced more than offers of large, well-known firms. As PIPOs tend to be larger than private sector IPOs this hypothesis suggests that initial returns in PIPOs should be lower than initial returns in private sector IPOs.
In another group of models underpricing is used as a signal that the firm is of a highvalue type (see e.g. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch, (1989) ). These models assume that issuers possess better information about the true value of the offer than investors. In the signaling approach by Welch (1989) , for example, high-quality firms deliberately choose an offer price below the intrinsic value to signal their quality to investors. This underpricing is motivated by the possibility of achieving higher offer prices in subsequent seasoned issues. High-quality firms will therefore underprice their issue and only offer a small part of their share capital at the initial issue. This implies a negative relationship between the level of underpricing and the fraction of the share capital sold at the initial offer.
8 Paudyal et al. (1998) e.g. document for Malaysian PIPOs as well as private sector IPOs a significantly positive association between the demand multiple and the underpricing. Similar results for UK are presented by Menyah and Paudyal (1996) .
See for example Ritter (1984) or Paudyal et al. (1998) .
A government committed to privatization has the objective that public offers of its state enterprises should be a success. One requirement for success is that the market price on the first trading days does not fall below the issue price. To keep the probability of an unsuccsessfull issue low, a higher market volatility will encourage the issuing government to set a lower offering price, which results in a higher underpricing. It is therefore expected that the market volatility prior to the issue is in a positive relationship with the underpricing. Following Menyah and Paudyal (1996) and Paudyal et al. (1998) , the market volatility is measured in the present study using the standard deviation of daily stock market index returns over three months prior to the subscription period. Perotti (1995) explicitly models privatizations within a signaling framework. Similar to Allen and Faulhaber (1989) , Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) or Welch (1989 ), Perotti (1995 presumes that there is informational asymmetry between the issuer -in the case of privatizations the issuing government -and the investors. An important feature of Perotti's (1995) model is that the issuer (the government) can influence a firm's value after the initial offer.
In his model Perotti (1995) Perotti's (1995) model is therefore that the relationship between the fraction sold at the initial offer and the underpricing level is positive for a market-oriented government.
For a market-oriented government it can be expected that the political uncertainty drops after the beginning of the privatization program due to the buildup of reputation over time. This has the testable implication that for a committed government the fraction of PIPOs sold at the initial offer should be highest at the beginning of the privatization program and drop thereafter. The same should be valid for the underpricing of PIPOs.
By contrast, a populist government is not willing to accept a (high) underpricing and the corresponding lower gross proceeds. A populist government would therefore also try to sell a not too small fraction, but at a maximum issue price (and therefore minimum underpricing). Biais and Perotti (1999) show that a market-oriented government can generate support for its privatization program by allocating more shares to median-class voters. Since a reversal of the privatization program decreases the value of the already privatized firms, median-class voters will support the privatization efforts of the government, which results in a support of the government in elections (re-election hypothesis). In order to make median-class voters buy enough shares so that their political preferences are similar to those of the government, underpricing is necessary. A government can achieve this aim by allocating a large portion to domestic retail investors (median-class voters) when selling a large fraction of a state enterprise. If this hypothesis applies, the underpricing should be higher for issues that meet two requirements: a) a relatively large fraction is sold at the initial offer and b) a relatively large portion is allocated to domestic retail investors. 
Long-Run Performance
The empirical evidence of the long-run performance of firms going public indicates that PIPOs and private sector IPOs do not perform similarly. Private sector IPOs mostly experience a negative abnormal performance over the first three to five years of aftermarket trading, 11 whereas PIPOs mostly experience a long-run aftermarket performance equal or better than that of benchmark firms.
A mostly non-negative long-run abnormal performance for PIPOs coincides with the objectives of a market-oriented government. As privatization programs in most cases last several years, a committed government will be interested in building up reputation for its privatization program over time. This is the only way to generate support in the population, which is necessary to successfully continue the program. For Poland the following hypothesis is tested in this context:
For PIPOs the long-run aftermarket performance from the first trading day till the third anniversary is non-negative.
As there is (at least some) evidence that PIPOs tend to outperform private sector IPOs in the long-run (see e.g. the empirical evidence in Menyah and Paudyal (1996) for the UK and Jelic and Briston (1999) for Hungary) it is also tested whether the long-run abnormal performance of Polish PIPOs significantly exceeds that of Polish private sector IPOs:
Hypothesis 10: The long-run abnormal performance of PIPOs from the first trading day till the third anniversary is significantly better than the 3-year abnormal performance of private sector IPOs. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) show in their model that the fraction a government sells at the initial offer is an important factor for the restructuring efforts of state enterprises. The higher the fraction sold, the lower is the possibility that politicians interfere directly. Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) conclude that the relationship between efficient restructuring activities and the fraction of the state enterprise sold at the initial offer should be positive. Provided that a lower state holding leads to a more efficient restructuring, the long-run abnormal performance should be positive. In this context the following hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 11: Political Influence: The higher the fraction of the share capital sold at the initial offer, the lower is the direct political influence. This implies a better restructuring and therefore a better long-run abnormal performance.
It is often cited that over-optimistic investors are one of the main reasons for a negative long-run performance (see e.g. Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) , Ritter (1991) or Loughran and Ritter (1995) ). Firms planning to go public make use of this over-optimism and time their IPO correspondingly. If investors lose their over-optimism in the course of time, this leads to a bad long-run performance (investors' sentiment hypothesis). The level of investors' optimism cannot be observed directly. As a proxy the demand multiple is used in this study. 13 The two testable hypothesis can be summarized as follows:
Hypothesis 12: Investors' sentiment: Firms with a high demand multiple experience a bad long-run performance. As the cut-off point between high and low demand multiples the median is used.
Data and sample characteristics
In Poland shares are traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE), which was founded The differences to the number of going publics can be explained by changes from one market segment to another and nine delistings. 14 The parallel market started on April 22 nd , 1993 and the free market on February 20 th , 1997.
13 Ljungqvist (1996) provides further variables that can be used as proxies for investors sentiment.
14 To avoid a delisting bias all delisted firms are included in this study.
This study uses the two biggest market segments: the main market and the parallel ma r- These are firms controlled by the Polish state and for most of them 100% of the shares were held by the state prior to going public.
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Examples of listing requirements (PLN numbers valid in the years 1998 and 1999) are the minimum value of shares to be admitted for trading (PLN 40 mil. for the main market versus PLN 14 mil. for the parallel market), the minimum book value of the company (PLN 40 mil. versus PLN 14 mil.), the minimum number of shareholders who hold shares to be admitted for trading (500 versus 300) and the period for which the company is required to disclose audited financial reports to the public (three financial years for the main market versus two financial years for the parallel market).
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Of the 52 PIPOs 50 went public in the main market and 2 in the parallel market. Of the 107 private sector IPOs 49 went public in the main market and 58 in the parallel market.
To build up the database three main sources were used: First, the Paudyal et al. (1998) ) and for Hungary the corresponding number is 41.7% (see Jelic and Briston (1999) ).
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REUTERS Business Briefing Archives is a comprehensive business database, with access to national and international news wires, news papers, trade journals, research reports and news pictures.
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For Non-UK PIPOs Jones et al. (1999) document an average fraction sold at the initial offer of only 37.9%. Similar results can be found in Huang and Levich (1998) .
The model of Perotti (1995) predicts that if there is higher political uncertainty about the future privatization policy, a market-oriented government will sell a higher fraction at the initial offer and will underprice more to signal its commitment. This implies that for a market-oriented Polish government the initial return should be higher than the global average (median) of 34.1% (12.4%) provided in Jones et al. (1999) . As section five shows this applies to the 52 PIPO sample used in this study. Paudyal et al. (1998) ).
In Poland trade unions have historically been very powerful. In the process of privatization it can therefore be expected that the government will particularly try to offer shares to the employees of the state enterprises. On average (median) 19.0% (18.7%) of the shares sold during the initial offer were sold to employees. This value is more than twice as high as the international evidence in Jones et al. (1999) . For their 59-country sample they report an average (median) portion sold to employees of 8.5% (7.0%).
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This underlines the strong and important position of trade unions in Poland and the political necessity to integrate Polish employees in the privatization program to a higher degree than in most other countries.
Initial return

Methodology and summary statistics
The starting point for investigating the initial returns is the calculation of initial raw returns and initial market-adjusted returns. The initial raw return for IPO i corresponds to its buy-and-hold return (BHR) from the issue price to the closing price on the first trading day and is defined as
where P i,0 represents the issue price and P i,1 the closing price on the first trading day of IPO i. The time index t=0 refers to the first day of the subscription period. The marketadjusted return (=underpricing) for each issue is defined as the difference between its initial raw return (the BHR i ) and the corresponding return on the market index: documented e.g. for Chile (7.6%, see Aggarwal et al. (1993) ), for Hungary (44%, see Jelic and Briston (1999) ), for the UK (38.7%, see Menyah and Paudyal, 1998) and France (25.1%, Jenkinson and Mayer (1988) ). Further details of these studies are reported in table 1. The observation that the Polish government sold a higher fraction at the initial offer than the average reported for Jones' 59-country sample is consistent with the predictions in Perotti (1995) . A market-oriented government selling a higher fraction at the initial offer has to underprice more to signal its commi tment. Altogether this indicates that the Polish government does not significantly underprice initial offers more than private company issuers do. Hypothesis 3, which implies that the underpricing level of PIPOs is higher than for private sector IPOs therefore has to be rejected.
According to hypothesis 7, a committed government has to underprice more to signal the willingness to give up control rights if a large fraction of the share capital is sold at
22
The unusually high initial return of Bank Slaski led to the resignation of the deputy finance minister Stefan Kawalec, who was in charge of privatizing the Polish banking sector. He was accused of having underestimated the value of the stock resulting in a high loss of money for the state budget.
Besides the probable undervaluation, there was also a second reason for the extremely high market prices on the first trading day: a delay in opening accounts and confirming the purchase of the . In the first and fourth subperiod no issue is underpriced by more than 100%.
The low underpricing and the high fraction sold in the first subperiod would suggest a populist (or at least a less committed) government. But another interpretation is that the first subperiod was used as a test phase by the Polish government. This view is supported by the fact that state-owned enterprises sold in the first subperiod are very small compared to PIPOs in the remaining periods. The average market values of PIPOs (measured using the first market price) in the last three subperiods are 14 to 182 times higher than in the first subperiod.
The underpricing level for private sector IPOs and the fraction sold at the initial offer do not behave in the same way as for PIPOs. Throughout the period considered the fraction sold is nearly constant at around 30% and the underpricing level decreases but from a lower level than for PIPOs. All in all, the evidence in table 5 provides no clear support for the view of a committed government in the sense of Perotti (1995) . Only if the first subperiod is excluded, do the fraction sold at the initial offer and the underpricing behave as prediced in hypothesis 7.
Multivariate cross-sectional analysis
In this section, the determinants of underpricing in Polish PIPOs and Polish private sector IPOs are studied in a multivariate cross-sectional analysis, testing hypotheses specified in section three. The following regression models are used:
Model I:
Model II:
where UP i is the underpricing (market-adjusted initial return) of issue i, MV i is the mar- and Frac i is the fraction of the share capital sold at the initial offer (hypothesis 4: signaling and hypothesis 6: political uncertainty I).
The variables LFR and Frac are highly correlated and cannot be used in the same model.
To test all hypotheses specified above it is therefore necessary to use two models. Other studies relating the fraction of the share capital sold to the underpricing level of PIPOs were made by Jones et al. (1999) for an international sample of 93 PIPOs, Menyah and Paudyal (1996) for the UK and Paudyal et al. (1998) for Malaysian PIPOs.
They report different findings. Paudyal et al. (1998) and Jones et al. (1999) document that a higher fraction sold is (significantly) related to higher underpricing levels. By contrast, Menyah and Paudyal (1996) find a significantly negative relationship for UK PIPOs.
To sum up, three out of five variables have a significant and positive impact on the underpricing of Polish PIPOs: the market volatility prior to the issue, the demand multiple and a dummy variable for the re-election hypothesis of Biais and Perotti (1999) . The signaling hypothesis (hypothesis 4) has to be rejected and the positive relationship between the underpricing level and the fraction sold is not significant. On the other hand, only the demand multiple and the fraction sold have significantly positive explanatory power for the underpricing of private sector IPOs.
Aftermarket Performance
The objective of this section is to examine the aftermarket performance of firms going public on the WSE. Besides the short-run aftermarket performance, which permits conclusions about the price adjustment process, the long-run aftermarket performance within three years of the first trading day is analyzed. Four hypothesis, specified in Section 3, are explicitly tested: hypothesis 9 (no negative long-run performance for PIPOs), hypothesis 10 (PIPOs experience a better long-run performance than private sector IPOs), hypothesis 11 (a lower direct political influence is associated with a better long run performance) and hypothesis 12 (investors sentiment: a high demand multiple at the issue leads to a bad long-run performance).
Methodology
To measure the performance of IPOs in the aftermarket buy-and-hold returns are calculated in a first step for each issue. In contrast to cumulative returns, which are sometimes used to measure long-horizon security, price performance buy-and-hold returns have the advantage that they are based on a realistic ex-ante trading strategy. The buyand-hold return for issue i (BHR i,T ) is defined as
where R i,t is the return of IPO i in period t and t = 2 indicates the second trading day in the aftermarket. 27 BHRs are calculated for the following time periods: T = 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 2 months, 1 year, 2 years and 3 years.
To be able to compare the aftermarket performance within the first three years after the first trading day for different time periods (e.g. one year and three years) only issues are used with a first trading day earlier than March 10 th , 1997. This leads to a reduction in the sample sizes to 83 firms for the sample of all issues, 38 firms for the sample of PIPOs and 45 firms for the sample of private sector IPOs.
To measure the abnormal performance of IPOs in the aftermarket it is first necessary to specify appropriate benchmarks. This task is of particular importance because it can affect the aftermarket performance measured. One possibility is to use a matching firm adjustment procedure, in which for each IPO firm a non-IPO firm of approximately similar size and the same industry is chosen. 28 Another possibility, which is used for markets in which the number of potential benchmark firms is low, is to use one or more 27 The starting point for measuring the aftermarket performance is therefore the closing price on the first trading day.
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See e.g. Ritter (1991) or Loughran and Ritter (1995) .
indices, e.g. a market index, as benchmark. 29 Because of the low number of firms listed in the first years after the resumption of the WSE a matching procedure (e.g. matching by size and industry) is not possible in Poland.
The aftermarket performance is therefore measured against the WIG-Index as a benc hmark. For comparison purposes and as a robustness check an equally weighted stock market index is used as an additional benchmark. 30 In a similar way to (5) the BHR of the WIG-Index for IPO i (BHR i,WIG,T ) is calculated as
(6) 
and BHARs are defined as
29
See e.g. Keloharju (1993) for the Finnish IPO market, Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) for the Swiss IPO market, Paudayal et al. (1998) for Malaysian and Jelic and Briston (1999) for Hungarian PIPOs and private sector IPOs.
30
It is common in the literature to use value-weighted as well as equally weighted stock market indices as benchmarks (see e.g. Loughran and Ritter (1995) or Brav and Gompers (1997) ). The WIG Index is a value-weighted index. Small PIPOs or private sector IPOs are therefore primarily compared with big firms. This is not the case when an equally weighted index used.
Another important point in measuring the long-run abnormal performance of security prices is the usage of appropriate test statistics. As the simulation results of Kothari and Warner (1997) , Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999) To minimize these sources of misspecification, this study includes all firms delisted on the WSE during the investigation period and uses buy-and-hold returns to calculate the long-run performance. In addition, to account for the skewness bias, a skewnessadjusted t-statistic with bootstrapped p-values (as suggested by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) ) and a non parametric Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank-Test are used to test the null hypothesis of no abnormal long-run performance. can be seen that in line with the evidence of many other markets the short-run aftermarket performance is not significantly different from zero. For the sample of all issues, for instance, the average BHAR over the first two months is -3.16%. A slightly negative short-run aftermarket performance can also be observed for PIPOs and private sector
Results
IPOs. All BHARs are not significantly different from zero. This result leads to the con-
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As a result of their simulation analyses concerning the long-run security price performance, Kothari, and Warner (1997) recommend using nonparametric and bootstrap tests to reduce misspecification.
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The results of using the equally-weighted market index are not shown for the short-run aftermarket performance. They are similar to those reported for the WIG index.
clusion that for Polish PIPOs as well as private sector IPOs there is full price adjustment on the first trading day. Similar results are documented for Hungary (see Jelic and Briston (1999) and Malaysia (see Paudyal et al. (1998) ).
(1998) for Malaysian PIPOs and in Boubakri and Cosset (1999) for a 26-country sample of 120 PIPOs.
PIPOs yield a highly significant mean unadjusted 3-year return of +435.1%. This is nearly four times higher than the average BHR Boubakri and Cosset (1999) To test whether the fraction of the share capital sold at the initial offer has an influence on the long-run performance the samples of PIPOs and private sector IPOs are each divided into two groups: a group with a large fraction sold (i.e. above the median) and a group with a low fraction sold (i.e. below the median). Panel A of table 9 summarizes the results. State enterprises of which the government sells a large fraction at the initial offer experience a positive abnormal 3-year performance of +86.9% whereas for enterprises of which only a small fraction is sold the average BHAR is -8% (WIG-index as benchmark). The difference is huge but not significant and the median difference is only 2%. If the EW-index is used as a benchmark, the mean and median-BHAR differences are not significant either. Because of the evidence provided hypothesis 11 therefore has to be rejected. The fraction sold at the initial offer has no influence on the long-run performance of private sector IPOs either. This evidence is consistent with the findings by Paudyal et al. (1998) for private sector IPOs in Malaysia.
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991) or Loughran and Ritter (1995) How can this result be interpreted? One reason for this observation might be that for some issues the marketing efforts of the government might have been too big, generating a too high demand for shares. The resulting over-optimism leads to first market prices above the 'true' equilibrium level. As investors correct their misvaluation over time, the long run performance will be below average.
Summary
This study examines the characteristics and the short-and long-run price behavior of two groups of firms going public in Poland: Case-by-case privatization initial public offerings (PIPOs) and private sector IPOs. Unlike other Central and Eastern European countries (e.g. Russia, the Czech Republic or Slovakia) Poland did not start its privatization process with a mass privatization program. Instead the Polish government privatized many firms through public offerings on a case-by-case basis.
On average Polish PIPOs as well as private sector IPOs are significantly underpriced.
With a mean of 60% the underpricing of PIPOs is about 40 percentage points above the underpricing of private sector IPOs. This huge difference is not statistically significant and can partly be explained by one particular privatization. In comparison to the international evidence provided in Jones et al. (1999) , the Polish government sold a higher fraction of the share capital at the initial offer and underpriced more than the average government in the world did. This observation is consistent with a committed government according to Perotti (1995) .
A multivariate cross-sectional analysis reveals that the underpricing of Polish PIPOs can best be explained by the market volatility prior to the issue and the demand multiple. In addition and in accordance with Biais and Perotti (1999) the underpricing is significantly higher for issues where the government sells a higher fraction of the share capital at the initial offer and allocates a larger portion to domestic retail investors. By contrast, only the demand multiple and the fraction sold at the initial offer have significant explanatory power for the underpricing of private sector IPOs.
The long-run performance provides interesting results: First, Polish PIPOs neither under-nor overperform benchmarks over the first three years of aftermarket trading. This is in contrast to Megginson et al. (1999) , who document for a 36-country sample of PIPOs a significantly positive long-run performance, but is in line with the observations of Boubakri and Cosset (1999) for a 26-country sample of PIPOs and of Paudyal et al. (1998) for Malaysian PIPOs. The non-negative long-run performance of Polish PIPOs is consistent with a market-oriented government trying to build up reputation for its privatization program in the course of time.
Second, the long-run abnormal performance of Polish PIPOs and private sector IPOs is not significantly different from each other. Third, PIPOs experiencing a high demand multiple at the initial issue underperform a low demand multiple portfolio of PIPOs significantly. This suggests that high demand multiples are associated with overoptimistic investors pushing market prices upwards on the first trading day, which results in a below-average long-run performance as investors correct their misvaluation. (2) respectively. In Panel A it is tested whether the means and medians of initial returns are significantly different from zero. For the means a skewness-adjusted test statistic with p-values using a bootstrapping procedure is employed (see Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) Underpricing results without the outlier Bank Slaski (underpricing = 1166.75%): All-mean = 64.51%, All-median = 20.56%; PIPOs-mean = 102.24%, PIPOs-median = 20.56%. 
where UP i = underpricing (market-adjusted initial return) of issue i; MV i = market volatility measured using the standard deviation of daily returns of the Warsaw stock exchange (WIG) index during the last three months before the subscription period of issue i; DM i = demand multiple of issue i; Risk i = two-month aftermarket return standard deviation of issue i; LFR i = dummy variable: coded 1 if a large fraction of the share capital is sold at the initial offer (i.e. a fraction above the median) and if, in addition, domestic retail investors receive a large portion of the issue (i.e. a portion above the median) and 0 otherwise); Frac i = fraction of the share capital sold at the initial offer. Test statistics in parentheses. The tolerance measures the degree of collinearity. The outlier Bank Slaski (UP = 1166.75%) has been excluded from the sample all issues (All) and the sample privatizations (PIPOs). Significant at the 5% level. (5) and (6) respectively. It is tested whether the BHRs and the BHARs are significantly different from zero. For the means a skewness-adjusted test statistic with p-values using a bootstrapping procedure is employed (see Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) Significant at the 5% level. Significant at the 5% level. Significant at the 5% level.
Model
